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Abstract 
Since the widely publicized revitalization success story of the Guggenheim Museum Bilbao, 
local governments have been scrambling to create their own flagship cultural projects. Due to the 
broad public sponsorship of such projects, urban planners need a full understanding of the 
associated potentials and problems. However, little research specifically examines the localized 
complexities of the flagship cultural strategy. Examining projects in Los Angeles, San Francisco, 
and San Jose, California, the article illustrates that much more than impressive architecture 
influences their catalytic ability. Flagship cultural projects are highly dependent on a variety of 
contextual factors and, therefore, should be positioned to build on existing arts and related 
commercial activity rather than gamble that they will generate new development from scratch. 
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Introduction  
Flagship cultural projects have become one of the most visible and established arts-based 
economic development initiatives throughout much of the world.1 Whether aimed at a global or 
regional audience, governments invest significant funds in these high-profile and often large-
scale museum and performing arts complexes anticipating their presence will enhance the city 
image, attract visitors, and generate commercial activity. A great deal of media attention and 
some scholarly work declares that the signature buildings designed by star architects, renowned 
art and performance companies, and commercial functions (e.g. blockbuster events, cafés, and 
stores) that characterize many of these projects boost municipal revenues and provide cities with 
a source of prestige (Anderson, 2004; Plaza, 2000, 2006). Others assert that cultural flagships 
enable very few cities to achieve and sustain the status of a cultural destination (Evans, 2003) 
and that project success comes only at the cost of social exclusion, displacement, and diminished 
attention to local artistic activity (M. Miles, 2005; Rodriguez et al., 2001). Still others question 
their economic impact altogether (Evans, 2005). Despite the risks, flagship cultural development 
has accelerated in the decade following the widely publicized revitalization success of the 
Guggenheim Museum Bilbao.2  
Due to their broad public sponsorship, urban planners and policy makers would do well 
to possess a full understanding of the potentials and problems associated with flagship cultural 
projects. However, the literature has largely focused on explaining the roles of cultural flagships 
in contemporary urban redevelopment and explored their physical, economic, and symbolic 
effects in fairly broad terms (Evans, 2003; Gomez, 1998; Hamnett and Shoval, 2003; Kong, 
2007; Rodriguez, 2001; Strom, 2002; Van Aalst and Boogaarts, 2002). Little research 
specifically examines the localized complexities of the flagship cultural strategy and the range of 
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factors that may influence the ability of a cultural institution to catalyze development.   
This article seeks to provide a more detailed understanding of flagship cultural 
development through case studies of established projects located in redevelopment areas in Los 
Angeles, San Francisco, and San Jose, California. Under what conditions do the flagship cultural 
projects catalyze development?  What are the factors that enable or hinder this ability? The first 
section provides a review of the literature on flagship development and cultural catalysts. The 
second part discusses the research method and project characteristics. The bulk of the article then 
analyzes three primary issues that affect the catalytic ability of the cultural institutions: the 
facility planning process, attributes of local and regional arts activity, and urban design. An 
analysis of these factors highlights that planners need to better position flagship cultural projects 
in relation to existing arts and related commercial activity rather than gambling that an 
architectural icon will catalyze new development from scratch. 
Flagship Cultural Projects as Urban Catalysts 
Flagship cultural projects are typically viewed as “catalytic projects” because they are 
intended to spur investment and consumption throughout the surrounding area (Bianchini et al., 
1992; Smyth, 1995). Attoe and Logan (1989, p. 45) define a catalytic project as a building that 
sparks “the incremental, continuous regeneration of the urban fabric” and “an element that 
impels and guides subsequent development.” Similarly, Jane Jacobs’ well-known recipe to 
support “city diversity”-- a mix of uses, short blocks, variously aged buildings, and a density of 
activity-- is based on the idea that such conditions allow primary land uses such as employment 
or educational centers to generate demand for secondary uses like retail and restaurants. For 
example, Jacobs relates how Carnegie Hall in New York City functions as a “primer” or catalyst 
for “secondary diversity,” in this case, performing arts studios, restaurants, and residential 
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buildings that in turn attract musicians and artists (Jacobs, 1961, 167). Essentially, the cultural 
facility directly attracts some of this activity and creates a spin-off effect indirectly attributed to 
it. While artists, for instance, may not be interested specifically in a site adjacent to Carnegie 
Hall, they may find the milieu that has formed around the Hall appealing. 
Although not addressed directly, Jacobs’ example also implies that the catalytic potential 
of a flagship building hinges on its symbolic qualities. Characteristics of the built environment 
work in conjunction with the distinctive image that a flagship project lends to the area, which 
certain types of users find attractive (Bianchini et al., 1992; Evans, 2003; Smyth, 1995). In 
contrast to Jacobs, however, Graeme Evans (2003) contends that the unavoidable consequences 
of this symbolic effect are gentrification and homogenization. By definition, flagship projects are 
intended to generate new, higher-end, consumption activity and, therefore, as they alter the 
character of their surroundings they inevitably drive rents upward and displace preexisting 
tenants or, reflecting on the Carnegie Hall example, out of reach for most artists. 
Finally, the Carnegie Hall example suggests that flagship cultural projects attract types of 
activity that other flagship projects like sports stadiums or convention centers rarely do and, 
consequently, affect the surrounding area in different ways. In theory, cultural flagships may 
directly and indirectly attract arts-related businesses and artists. Additionally, whereas flagship 
sports and events facilities tend to be seasonal attractions or bring concentrated activity to an 
area for a short period of time, museums and art centers attract a more steady flow of visitors 
throughout the year. Further, many visit the bookstore and café or attend an education program 
or lecture without setting foot inside the galleries. Sports stadia and convention centers, by 
contrast, are closed to the public outside of game time and rarely sponsor supplementary 
activities that bring people to the area. Cultural flagships differ from other flagship projects in 
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terms of image as well. Whereas many urban entertainment destinations feature the same 
corporate logos from place to place, cultural flagships often offer a distinct architectural icon. 
Still, they too face “brand decay” as their uniqueness wears off and newer, more spectacular 
buildings are constructed elsewhere (Evans, 2003). 
There is growing body of research devoted to cultural flagships, which largely supports 
the common critiques of flagship projects as isolated and exclusive spaces that are designed to 
serve visitors over residents and that are divorced from any public planning process (Bianchini et 
al., 1992; Eisinger, 2000; Swyngedouw et al., 2002). A few case studies do challenge these 
arguments by emphasizing that the intangible and adaptable character of culture allows these 
redevelopment projects to reflect multiple meanings (S. Miles, 2005) and, in the process, become 
sites of political contest (De Frantz, 2005). However, these case studies and others (Evans, 2003; 
Garcia, 2005; Kong, 2007) concentrate on the ability of cultural flagships to influence place 
images and identity rather than specifically analyzing the factors that may influence their 
catalytic role. Not only do we lack a solid base of case studies that specifically address the 
catalytic process in relation to flagship cultural projects, but case studies of cultural projects in 
Europe and particularly of the Guggenheim Bilbao far outweigh US examples. In fact, a recent 
study by Plaza and Haarich (2008) finds that 110 articles were published in scientific journals on 
the Guggenheim Bilbao between 1997 and 2008.  
In terms of catalytic development, Strom’s (1999) tentative assessment of the New Jersey 
Performing Arts Center in Newark and studies of the Guggenheim Bilbao and other European 
cities underscore the emphasis on area revitalization rather than traditional economic 
development measures such as jobs or tax dollars (Rodriguez et al., 2001; Van Aalst and 
Boogaarts, 2002; Vicario and Martinez Monje, 2003). Other studies of the Guggenheim Bilbao 
6 
 
attempt to gauge that museum’s impact on the local tourist economy by measuring visitor 
attendance and hotel stays (Plaza, 2000, 2006). Only Sternberg (2002) has attempted to 
understand how “cultural catalysts” generate-- or fail to generate-- surrounding development.  
Drawing on Jacobs and Attoe and Logan, he offers guidelines to enhance the catalytic effect of a 
cultural facility. Sternberg emphasizes that planners should design cultural projects with direct 
linkages to commercial space in the surrounding area, provide good access to public transit and 
parking, and focus on generating pedestrian traffic. Although Sternberg’s study is helpful, we 
need to examine additional factors that may influence the catalytic ability of flagship cultural 
projects as well. Factors external to the physical environment may alter or even negate the 
benefits of catalytic design and, therefore, should be considered in the planning process. 
Research Methods 
This article draws on case study research to better understand the factors that influence 
the catalytic ability of flagship cultural projects. The study sites include three central city 
redevelopment projects in which cultural institutions are a central component. In Los Angeles, 
the Museum of Contemporary Art (MOCA) is a centerpiece of the Bunker Hill Redevelopment 
Area; in Yerba Buena Center, the San Francisco Redevelopment Agency has assisted multiple 
cultural institutions including, most prominently, the San Francisco Museum of Modern Art 
(SFMOMA) and the Yerba Buena Center for the Arts (YBCA); and, in San Jose, major 
Redevelopment Agency funding enabled the San Jose Museum of Art (SJMA), Tech Museum of 
Innovation, and the San Jose Repertory Theatre to build new homes that anchor the city’s 
downtown redevelopment area. I selected the study sites because of the prominence of the 
flagship cultural projects in the redevelopment areas and because each cultural institution was 
established over ten years ago, which provides a reasonable period over which to study project 
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outcomes. All of the cultural institutions were designed by renowned architects and contain 
multiple exhibition and/or performance spaces along with other revenue generating activities 
such as a store and café. All received substantial assistance from a redevelopment agency whose 
primary goal was to create a high-profile project that would improve the image of the 
redevelopment area and attract visitors and commercial development. As is often the case in US 
cultural project schemes, the cultural affairs agency or state arts council had little or no 
involvement. Given their age, these projects may provide a glimpse into the future of many of 
today’s newer flagships whose currently spectacular architecture will likely become less 
impressive over time as other projects steal the spotlight.  
Although located in California, each site exhibits contrasting features as well. First, while 
Yerba Buena experienced significant community protest during the planning process, which 
delayed project construction and altered the final design and land uses (Hartman, 2002), neither 
Bunker Hill or downtown San Jose were forced open to public input. Second, each of the 
redevelopment areas differ in terms of urban design. MOCA’s home, Bunker Hill, is notorious 
for its insulated superblocks and corporate towers (Davis, 1990; Loukaitou-Sideris and Banerjee, 
1998). In contrast, Yerba Buena Center and downtown San Jose feature a more pedestrian-
friendly environment, varied building types, and central public spaces. However, whereas Yerba 
Buena contains many high-rises, San Jose is exclusively low and mid-rise. Third, the cities are 
home to very different arts communities. San Francisco and, particularly Los Angeles, are two of 
the most populous cities in terms of artists and arts institutions, while San Jose contains a much 
smaller arts scene (Markusen and Schrock, 2006; Szanto, 2003; Zenk, 2005).  
The analysis is based on a combination of in-depth interviews, site observation, survey, 
and analysis of documentary sources. Interviewees were selected because they played a 
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significant role in the redevelopment project or cultural institutions or have worked and/or lived 
in the project area for a substantial period of time. Interview subjects included redevelopment 
agency officials formerly and currently involved in each project area; former and current 
directors and staff at each of the major cultural institutions; members of neighborhood groups 
and business associations; and local artists, gallery owners, and directors of nonprofit cultural 
organizations (see Appendix). Interviews lasted on average 50 minutes and were structured 
around a set of ten to twelve open-ended questions shared with the interviewee in advance of the 
meeting. Questions focused on the planning and development process and the relationship 
between the cultural institutions, redevelopment agencies, and local arts and commercial activity. 
Documentary sources included requests for proposals, disposition and development agreements, 
redevelopment project plans, annual reports for the redevelopment project and cultural 
institutions as well as various news sources that featured articles on the cultural institutions and 
downtown redevelopment in each city. Additionally, because the Yerba Buena study area 
contains significantly more arts spaces than the others, I distributed a short survey to 20 arts 
establishments immediately surrounding SFMOMA and YBCA. The purpose of the survey was 
to better understand why these entities chose their location and the benefits and drawbacks of 
this location. Twelve organizations responded to the survey and the relevant information was 
gathered from the websites of 5 others.   
Following the existing literature, I defined a catalyst as a cultural building or institution 
with the ability to attract commercial development (e.g. residential, office, retail, restaurants, 
etc.), arts activity (e.g. galleries, art spaces, artist studios, and cultural institutions), and people. 
However, rather than assuming that such outcomes are uniformly positive, I also took into 
account the negative side-effects of catalytic development including the loss or displacement of 
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commercial tenants, arts organizations, and artists. In order to determine if a cultural project 
played a role in catalyzing or pushing out development, I first attempted to gain a basic 
understanding of the conditions in each redevelopment area before and after establishment of the 
flagship cultural projects. This entailed documentation of all commercial development and arts 
activity prior to the opening of the cultural facilities and that presently exist. I also obtained all 
available annual visitor records at each of the cultural institutions since their inception. Second, 
after collecting this information, I sought to determine the role of the cultural projects, if any, in 
attracting commercial, arts, and tourism-related activity to the area. To do so, I relied on the 
interviews, survey research (in San Francisco), and the documentary sources described above, all 
of which provided useful information toward understanding why a particular establishment 
located in the redevelopment area. Although I did not attempt to directly measure or conclusively 
prove the catalytic impact of the cultural institutions, drawing on the knowledge of informed 
participants and these other sources does capture the impacts as perceived by those affected by 
and involved in the project and, therefore, provides important insight into the relationship 
between the cultural flagships and their local context.3 
Finally, I focused on three factors that may affect the catalytic ability of the cultural 
institutions. First, I considered the urban design characteristics in the project area that Sternberg 
(2002) and Jacobs (1961) associate with catalytic projects.4 This includes the presence of 
compatible commercial activity within walking distance of the cultural project, a concentration 
and mix of different types of commercial activity, and the existence of physical and perceptual 
features that encourage or discourage pedestrian activity. I also examine the influence of design 
decisions made during project planning. Second, I consider if and how the cultural projects 
contribute to producing an environment that is attractive to artists and arts establishments. Here, I 
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focus on the relative affordability, the type of space available, the presence of compatible arts 
activity, the image of the area, and the existence of artists, patrons and related activity in the 
metropolitan region. Cultural flagships may also serve to build the local arts scene through 
programming and related activities, but I explore this elsewhere (Grodach, 2008a). Finally, I 
concentrate on two aspects of the planning process: the approach to financing and development 
of the cultural projects and the role and level of community participation in project planning. By 
analyzing each of these factors in the specific cases, I seek to better understand how local 
particularities may shape the catalytic potential of these flagship cultural projects and highlight 
issues that planners should be aware of when pursuing their own cultural projects.  
Flagship Cultural Development and Planning in Three California Cities 
Bunker Hill 
 MOCA anchors California Plaza, a mixed use complex of high-rise buildings and quasi-
public plazas within the 133 acre Bunker Hill Redevelopment Area in downtown Los Angeles. 
Opened in 1986, the 100,000 square foot, $23 million facility was designed by Arata Isozaki and 
funded entirely through the Community Redevelopment Agency of Los Angeles’ (CRA) public 
art fund, which specified that the California Plaza developers contribute 1.5% of the total project 
cost towards financing of the museum building. Although the Los Angeles County Music 
Center-- a 1960’s-era complex modeled on Lincoln Center-- had opened in Bunker Hill over a 
decade prior, the CRA believed a museum containing “a world-renowned collection of modern 
art” in a “showcase structure” could transform the corporate office complex into an urban center 
and attract visitors and art and tourism-related activity (Community Redevelopment Agency, 
1979, 5; Cosgrove, 2005, interview). 
 In the Request for Proposals (RFP), MOCA was located at the center of the project on 
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Grand Avenue along and surrounded by a large public space. Other cultural and entertainment 
uses complimented the museum including Water Court (an outdoor performance space), a 12-
screen cineplex, and the Bella Lewitzky Dance Gallery (Community Redevelopment Agency, 
1979; 1981). However, with the bankruptcy of the master developer, among other factors, 
California Plaza was redesigned around a set of disconnected plazas (Loukaitou-Sideris and 
Banerjee, 1998) and, with the exception of Water Court, the other amenities were never built. In 
addition, the succeeding project developers enforced a 40 foot height limit on MOCA, which 
necessitated that the museum’s main entry and café be located below street-level. Focused 
primarily on building finance, the CRA neglected to negotiate with the developers on these 
terms, which were antithetical to the flagship concept. Moreover, unresolved issues arose in 
relation to community participation. In particular, many local artists complained that they were 
excluded from museum planning despite the establishment of an Artists Advisory Council by the 
MOCA board (Berelowitz, 1991; Keating, 2005, interview). 
 Despite this muddled planning process, as the first museum in Los Angeles dedicated 
entirely to contemporary art, MOCA provided a new icon that helped to elevate the image of the 
city as an international arts destination. Further, the downtown location was significant because 
it represented a symbolic deconcentration of arts activity away from West Los Angeles where 
virtually all of the city’s other major cultural institutions are located (Szanto, 2003). These 
accomplishments were reinforced when the Temporary Contemporary, which opened downtown 
in 1983 as a temporary venue for MOCA during fundraising, was established as a permanent 
facility in 1986.    
Still, MOCA has fallen short of the CRA’s economic development goals. First, MOCA 
never functioned as a strong magnet for tourists. The museum’s 250,000 annual visitors pale in 
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comparison to other cultural destinations in the city such as LACMA or the Getty Center in West 
Los Angeles, which report an average annual attendance of 800,000 and 1.3 million respectively 
(Museum of Contemporary Art, n.d.).   
Second, MOCA has not played a strong role in generating residential and commercial 
development. In the decade following MOCA’s inauguration, just two residential projects 
opened in Bunker Hill and the surrounding blocks. The developers of one such residential high-
rise, which opened in 1992, attempted to capitalize on their site adjacent to the museum by 
naming the project Museum Tower. Prior to opening, the CRA described this building as 
shrouded in “concrete and stone finishes…reflective of those of MOCA” and featuring 
“museum-oriented retail space” (Community Redevelopment Agency, 1990, 14). As multiple 
CRA staff attest, virtually all of the restaurant and retail that has opened in California Plaza 
caters to lunch service for the employees within Bunker Hill’s office towers. This remains the 
case even after the 1998 opening of the Colburn School of Music and the 2003 addition to the 
Los Angeles Music Center of the iconic Disney Concert Hall across the street.5 As 
representatives of both the CRA and MOCA explain, although the Colburn was attracted by 
MOCA’s presence, it was foremost the unplanned availability of land that enabled the move 
(Murphy, 2005, interview; Spivack, 2005, interview; Wiant, 2005, interview).6 Although these 
cultural facilities have provided an attractive selling point for the many loft-style condominium 
projects that have recently sprouted downtown, the primary catalysts for this residential boom 
are more likely state tax credits for developers and, until recently, low interest mortgages and a 
booming California real estate market.   
Similarly, MOCA has never truly functioned as an artistic nucleus. Although the 
announcement of MOCA’s opening downtown initially generated attention to the fledgling 
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downtown arts scene, reports of a rising homeless population and crime actually caused many 
artists and galleries to leave the area as it became difficult to attract patrons (Athey, 2004; 
Friedrich, 2005; Keating, 2005, interview; Spivack, 2005, interview). More recently, however, 
downtown has experienced a major increase in galleries and art spaces (Friedrich, 2002; Lion 
and Hernandez, 2006). A majority of this activity has occurred not around MOCA, but in Gallery 
Row, an arts district established in 2003 just below Bunker Hill. While Gallery Row organizers 
market their location near “cultural anchors” such as MOCA and Disney Hall to lure prospective 
galleries and clients, neither were factors in the establishment or growth of the arts district 
(Green, 2005, interview). Rather, it is the Gallery Row organizers and the presence of young 
professionals in the new residential buildings that have engendered arts-led development here.  
Yerba Buena Center 
 SFMOMA and YBCA are the most well-known cultural institutions at Yerba Buena 
Center, an 87 acre redevelopment project located in the South of Market area. Formerly 
comprised of light industry and SRO housing, the San Francisco Redevelopment Agency’s 
(SFRA) core objective at YBC was to physically and symbolically transform the area into an arts 
and entertainment destination and link it to the galleries, shopping, and tourism north of Market 
Street in nearby Union Square (San Francisco Redevelopment Agency, 1979; Sause, 2005, 
interview).   
 Although planning for YBC began in the 1960’s, a series of lawsuits brought by resident 
and community groups to stop redevelopment stalled the project and, ultimately, compelled the 
Agency to incorporate the views of a series of community advisory committees into the planning 
process (Hartman, 2002). As a result, the SFRA moved away from its initial “protected 
environment” design scheme, which proposed high-rise office buildings as a buffer to insulate 
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the new commercial development from the surrounding area portrayed by the Agency as a 
transient and crime-filled “skid row” (San Francisco Redevelopment Agency, 1969). Instead, 
planners preserved many of the smaller blocks and alleys adjacent to the cultural flagships and 
designed Yerba Buena Gardens park with convention facilities below ground. In addition, the 
Agency not only sought arts facilities to attract development to the area, but also as a 
“community give-back” (Pickering, 2005, interview; Sause, 2005, interview). This is a key factor 
in the  creation of YBCA, which opened in 1993. The cultural institution is largely the product of 
an Agency-appointed committee of artists, which devised a dual mission that emphasized the 
incubation of regional artists and multicultural artistic representation (Center for the Arts at 
Yerba Buena Gardens, 1994; Cultural Planning Technical Assistance Committee, 1983; Pritikin, 
2005, interview). The primary cultural flagship at YBC, however, is SFMOMA. Founded in 
1935, the museum opened at YBC in 1995 in a new 225,000 square foot home designed by 
Mario Botta on valuable real estate provided by the SFRA. In addition, following the bankruptcy 
of the initial project developer, Olympia and York, the Agency sought development firms on a 
project-by-project basis. In the process, the Agency extracted substantial funds and land toward 
the construction of buildings for some cultural institutions (YBCA, Zeum) and required that new 
residential and office developments provide ground floor space for others (Museum of the 
African Diaspora, California Historical Society). Further, the Agency established a linkage 
policy that requires major commercial tenants to contribute to a fund (approximately $4.8 million 
annually) that offsets the annual operation and maintenance costs of some area cultural 
institutions (including YBCA) and the Yerba Buena Gardens park.   
Today, the Moscone Convention Center, SFMOMA, and the cultural district surrounding 
the Yerba Buena Gardens has all but erased the “skid row” past. In terms of generating 
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commercial development, the SFRA cultural strategy has been very successful. Of the eighteen 
major commercial projects developed at YBC since the opening of the Moscone Convention 
Center in 1981, only four opened before YBCA and SFMOMA (including the conspicuously 
named Museum Parc Condominiums). Moreover, the presence of YBCA and SFMOMA, in 
conjunction with the extensive SFRA involvement, has transformed YBC into one of the largest 
clusters of nonprofit cultural institutions in the city. In addition, nearly two dozen galleries and 
many other restaurants and arts-based businesses are currently operating in and adjacent to the 
redevelopment area where they have found appropriately sized and flexible spaces in the 
redevelopment area’s older low-rise and warehouse buildings. According to the survey of YBC 
galleries and cultural organizations, the majority state that they were attracted to the area for the 
comparatively lower rent than other areas, the type of space, and the arts-based image and high 
volume of pedestrian traffic that SFMOMA and YBCA generate. Additionally, galleries enjoy 
close proximity to the more established arts district in Union Square. However, YBC’s very 
success, compounded by the dot-com induced real estate boom of the late 1990’s, produced the 
sort of issues that Evans (2003) emphasizes, namely gentrification and the associated threat to 
artistic diversity. As YBC has become a renowned arts center, the area has likewise become 
unaffordable to the lower budget, artist-run spaces that YBCA was modeled on and which 
inhabited the neighborhood prior to redevelopment. Further, virtually all of the arts and 
commercial development has occurred in the blocks immediately surrounding SFMOMA and 
YBCA in the direct path of Union Square and has not spread throughout the entire area as the 
Agency hoped.   
Overall, however, the cultural institutions have succeeded in meeting the Agency’s goal 
of luring visitors across the once formidable boundary of Market Street. SFMOMA alone 
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annually brings over 637,000 visitors to YBC, 42% of which reside in the Bay area (San 
Francisco Museum of Modern Art, 2004). Although YBCA does not attract nearly as large an 
audience (average annual attendance is 170,196), 86% of its visitors are Bay Area residents 
(Yerba Buena Center for the Arts, 2004). Still, like many cultural institutions, this audience is 
not necessarily an adequate reflection of regional demographics.7  
Downtown San Jose 
San Jose’s low-rise, pedestrian-scale downtown is anchored by a set of prominent 
cultural facilities and public spaces. Of the three redevelopment areas, it most closely resembles 
the design qualities identified by Sternberg (2002) and Jacobs (1961).  For example, in addition 
to preserving the original street grid, the Agency required all new commercial buildings to 
contain street-facing entrances, face the property line, and be oriented to the grid (Aidala and 
Skevos, 2003). The Agency also helped to create a downtown transit mall, Cesar Chavez Park, 
and Paseo de San Antonio, a promenade lined with retail and restaurant spaces. The Paseo is 
anchored at one end by the 78,000 square foot San Jose Museum of Art (SJMA), which was able 
to triple in size through Agency funding. SJMA also faces onto Cesar Chavez Park, as does the 
Tech Museum of Innovation, which opened in an 132,000 square foot building by Ricardo 
Legorreta in 1998. At the other end of the Paseo sits San Jose State University and the San Jose 
Repertory Theatre, a regional company that opened in its new downtown home in 1997. As for 
SJMA, the Agency contributed major funding and key building sites for both cultural 
institutions. The purpose of this major downtown investment-- made possible by tax increment 
revenue from the Agency’s flourishing tech-based office parks-- was to establish a “civic context 
for private development” (Claiborne, 2004, 5; Korabiak, 2005, interview; Mavrogenes, 2005, 
interview). In particular, the Agency felt that the flagship cultural projects would cultivate an 
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image of San Jose as the “unique creative and cultural center of Silicon Valley” (City of San 
Jose, 2003, 4-5) and, according to the Agency director, create a distinctive urban experience that 
would catalyze development and attract nearby suburbanites and even tourists from San 
Francisco and Monterey (Mavrogenes, 2005, interview). Adjacent to the downtown 
redevelopment district, is the South of First Area (SoFA). Despite being home to a number of 
smaller-scale, homegrown art spaces, bars and restaurants, this former red-light district has 
received surprisingly little attention from the Redevelopment Agency. 
Although none are phenomenal draws, the three cultural flagships have been crucial in 
attracting visitors particularly after standard business hours. In 2004, they collectively brought 
715,000 visitors downtown, roughly two-thirds of whom traveled from within Santa Clara 
County and many of these from the surrounding suburban communities (San Jose Museum of 
Art, 2005; San Jose Repertory Theatre, 2005; Tech Museum, 2005).  In addition, thanks largely 
to a policy of free admission created in 2001, SJMA has attracted an audience that is much more 
diverse than typical contemporary art museums and one that reflects the regional population. 
Largely mirroring the County, just over half of its audience is White and just over one quarter is 
Asian, although only 13% are Hispanic compared to 25% in the County (San Jose Museum of 
Art, 2005).  SJMA balances upper and lower income brackets as well-- 24% of its audience earns 
less than $15,000 and 28% earn over $100,000 annually.   
Still, Redevelopment Agency officials readily admit that the presence of cultural 
institutions in carefully designed civic spaces has not catalyzed development as anticipated 
(Korabiak, 2005, interview; Mavrogenes, 2005, interview). No major project has opened 
downtown without a multimillion-dollar Agency subsidy and most regional hi-tech firms, a 
primary target of Agency efforts, have largely remained in the industrial parks on the city’s 
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fringes seemingly uninterested in downtown’s cultural amenities and pedestrian spaces. Further, 
the downtown retail sector has for the most part been sluggish despite Redevelopment Agency 
financing, which was used to lure numerous chain retail and restaurants such as Starbucks, 
McCormick and Schmidt’s Seafood, and Johnny Rockets to Paseo de San Antonio. In 2006, 200 
stores and restaurants were located in the entire downtown (San Jose Redevelopment Agency, 
2006). In comparison, just a few miles away, the Westfield Valley Fair Mall contains 270 stores 
and restaurants (Sarkar, 2005) and the adjacent “lifestyle center” Santana Row, which opened in 
2002, contains 95 stores and restaurants. Even if the Redevelopment Agency were to argue that 
the combination of subsidies and cultural flagships have catalyzed commercial activity, their 
ability is limited by the competition not only from these local shopping areas, but also from 
regional retail destinations. Similarly, the Agency’s cultural flagships have not attracted arts-
related activity downtown. Similar to the situation in downtown Los Angeles, numerous smaller-
scale art spaces have gravitated to the more home-grown SoFA rather than the Agency’s 
downtown redevelopment.   
Case Study Analysis 
These case studies illustrate that the catalytic process is more complex than can be 
captured in terms of architecture and design alone. Although designing cultural projects within a 
concentration and a mix of commercial establishments, minimizing physical and perceptual 
barriers to pedestrian activity, and similar design guidelines are important, there are a number of 
factors not identified by Sternberg (2002) or Jacobs (1961) that have an effect on the catalytic 
ability of the flagship cultural projects. In the first place, the cases show that decisions made 
during the facility planning process-- namely approaches to financing and community 
participation in design and programming decisions-- can have lasting impacts on the catalytic 
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ability of the cultural projects. Additionally, planners need to pay attention to attributes of the 
immediate area that specifically meet the requirements of compatible arts activity including 
attention to the type and affordability of available space, the aesthetic character of the area, and 
the structure of the arts both nearby and throughout the region.  
Urban Design 
MOCA’s inability to attract development and visitors supports Jacobs’ and Sternberg’s 
claim that certain design features hinder the catalytic process, although, as discussed below, 
other factors are at play as well. The wide streets, inward-facing plazas, and limited ground-level 
street access characteristic of California Plaza and Bunker Hill physically restrict pedestrian 
activity and sever perceptual connections to the museum from beyond the project boundaries 
(Fig. 1). This disconnected location diminishes MOCA’s ability to attract visitors and impedes 
the establishment and maintenance of physical connections with other downtown arts districts 
(Clark, 2005, interview; Wiant, 2005, interview). Further, MOCA is not located among a 
concentration and mix of commercial activity either. Virtually all retail and restaurant sites in 
California Plaza are located at the opposite end of the project and cater to the office tower 
employees rather than the museum and its mostly weekend visitors. These design and siting 
issues help in part to explain why, despite MOCA’s international reputation and Los Angeles’ 
very sizable arts community, the museum has not attracted the kind of activity that the museum 
board and CRA anticipated.   
 
[Figure 1: MOCA’s location in California Plaza creates physical and perceptual barriers for the 
museum.] 
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In contrast, SFMOMA and YBCA are much more integrated into the urban fabric. The 
varied types of buildings in the YBC alleys are attractive to a variety of arts and commercial 
activity and provide, as one arts organization director put it, “a unique pedestrian experience” 
(Whiting, 1996) (Fig. 2).  The redevelopment area is also highly accessible in that it is near the 
Bay Bridge, connected by multiple bus routes, two BART transit stops, and is a short walk from 
Union Square. At the same time, however, YBC is not without design flaws. Despite alterations 
to the “protected environment” concept, the western project boundary retains a hard edge defined 
by convention and parking facilities, which visually and physically distinguishes YBC from the 
surrounding area and discourages pedestrian and nighttime activity there while the larger scale 
buildings do not allow the concentration and mix of activity that appears in the alleys at the other 
end of the project (Fig. 3). Moreover, although just two blocks from SFMOMA and YBCA, the 
short blocks and alleys that exist immediately beyond this buffer contain far less development 
than those immediately around these cultural institutions.   
 
[Figures 2: Yerba Buena Center alleys adjacent to SFMOMA and YBCA are attractive to a 
variety of arts and commercial activity.] 
[Figure 3: Yerba Buena Center’s western project boundary creates a barrier to the surrounding 
area.]   
 
Conversely, flagship cultural development in downtown San Jose reveals the limits of 
urban design. While the cultural institutions enjoy an accessible and walkable mixed-use 
environment that satisfies many of the criteria for cultural catalysts described above, they have 
largely failed to attract commercial and arts-related activity (Fig. 4). Therefore, although 
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attention to urban design is important, the creation of a mix of uses, a diverse built environment, 
and pedestrian activity are not necessarily sufficient to guarantee that a cultural project will 
catalyze development. Project planners must go beyond general urban design prescriptions and 
also take into account conditions specific to the project and its local and regional context. 
 
[Figure 4: San Jose Museum of Art (left) and Paseo de San Antonio (right) contribute to 
downtown San Jose’s accessible and walkable environment.] 
 
Arts Activity 
 The ability of a flagship project to catalyze development is, foremost, dependent on the 
existence of and demand by individuals and establishments interested in a location near the 
project. If cultural flagships are unique compared to other flagship projects because they can 
attract and support arts-related establishments than their needs must be a central consideration in 
the planning process. As each of the cases demonstrate, beyond the simple presence of the 
cultural flagship, demand is influenced by attributes of the local area related to arts activity 
including the availability of suitable types of space, the relative affordability of these spaces, and 
the existence of compatible arts and commercial activity prior to flagship development. Another 
important factor concerns the aesthetic character of the area. Finally, characteristics of the arts in 
the surrounding region play a role in flagship cultural development outcomes. Because arts 
communities are comprised of a diversity of individuals and groups working in a wide range of 
artistic disciplines and mediums (e.g. visual, performing, literary, and media arts) and multiple 
institutional sectors (e.g. commercial, nonprofit, and informal), planning around the cultural 
flagship should respond to the requirements of different actors and recognize that all may not 
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need or want to be near a cultural flagship.  
Although none of the redevelopment agencies actually planned for arts activity at this 
level, the YBC area already contained many of these features, which helps to account for the 
comparative success there. First, there were existing spaces in the redevelopment area 
appropriate for a variety of small-scale arts and compatible commercial activity. In particular, 
galleries located in the YBC alleys that offered larger and more affordable space than adjacent 
Union Square, while still in close proximity to the city’s primary gallery hub and, therefore, their 
existing customer base.8 Similarly, for nonprofit cultural institutions a YBC location meant that 
they were near a major tourist destination. In other words, although important, SFMOMA and 
YBCA were not first movers, nor does the presence of the cultural flagships solely account for 
the high level of development at YBC.  
Both downtown San Jose and Bunker Hill are unattractive to art galleries and other arts-
related business. For MOCA, the redevelopment agency assumed that the museum in and of 
itself would ignite development and transform Bunker Hill into more of an arts destination. 
However, although the Los Angeles Music Center is nearby, there were no visual arts 
establishments in the immediate area prior to MOCA. Additionally, there is little commercial 
space near the museum and none of it was developed specifically for low and mid-budget arts 
uses. Further, artists that live and work in downtown Los Angeles state that even if suitable space 
were available, rents are unaffordable for most small-scale arts-related businesses and services. 
In downtown San Jose, although the redevelopment area is pedestrian-friendly and contains 
spaces that could be used by galleries and arts establishments surrounding SJMA and elsewhere, 
San Jose’s smaller-scale contemporary art spaces have clustered in nearby SoFA. SoFA is more 
attractive because the area already contained arts organizations and related commercial 
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establishments (prior to the Agency’s downtown efforts) and is likewise close to SJSU, has easy 
freeway access, and relatively high foot traffic due to neighboring bars and nightclubs (Eder and 
Lackey, 2005, interview). In short, SoFA offers prospective arts tenants a similarly pedestrian 
environment but is more affordable, varied, and in a more established environment of their peers-
- more important factors than proximity to a flagship cultural project. 
The look and feel of the area surrounding the cultural flagships plays a role in attracting 
arts development as well. In fact, along with the cultural projects, the combination of factors 
described above contributed to YBC’s arts-based image, which was crucial to lure development 
across the psychological barrier of Market Street. Indeed, while YBC has successfully 
maintained this image in the portion of the project adjacent to Union Square, in the opposite 
direction the area just outside the project boundaries is perceived as dangerous by gallery clients 
(Pritikin, 2005, interview; Schuman, 2005, interview; Togonon, 2005, interview). As a result, the 
catalytic influence has been very localized and contributed to rent increases that prohibit entry by 
the smaller, lower-budget alternative art spaces (Baker, 1995), which also may be less interested 
in a location near a flagship project than a contemporary art gallery or a mid-sized cultural 
nonprofit. In Los Angeles, the corporate identity that defines California Plaza and Bunker Hill 
further contributes to a lack of interest from artists and arts business. This is accentuated by the 
rise of adjacent Gallery Row, which is described by artists there as “another SoHo or Chelsea” 
(Kim, 2005, interview) with “the best arts vibe anywhere” (Waters, 2005, interview). Finally, in 
San Jose, because the Redevelopment Agency conceived of downtown as an urban experience 
that would appeal to suburban residents from throughout the Santa Clara Valley, it is perhaps not 
surprising that those involved in the arts interviewed feel that the physical environment 
downtown is bland, restrictive, and does not offer a “unique setting that really speaks to San 
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Jose” (Alvarado, 2005, interview; Eder and Lackey, 2005, interview).   
In addition to characteristics of the surrounding area, flagship cultural development can 
be affected by regional-level arts activity. Contrasting the greater San Jose region and the San 
Francisco Bay Area is illustrative here. Put simply, San Francisco possesses a much more 
concentrated and established arts scene than San Jose. In a number of ways, this provides a built 
in base of support and demand, which the YBC cultural flagships can potentially attract to the 
area. First, a key difference between the two regions is the divergent size of the artist 
populations. Although San Jose and San Francisco are two of the most populated regions in the 
country, San Jose contains just 84% of the average national share of artistic employment while 
San Francisco exceeds the national average by 82% (Markusen and Schrock, 2006). Second, the 
cities differ in terms of the overall density and distribution of artists. The relatively small share 
of artists in the Santa Clara Valley are spread throughout San Jose and adjacent cities and do not 
congregate in an established center (Davis, 2005, interview; Eder and Lackey, 2005, interview). 
In contrast, San Francisco’s artists have long clustered in various neighborhoods in the central 
city ranging from the Beats in North Beach in the 1950’s to current hotspots like the Mission 
District and the South of Market area, of which YBC is a part. Third, cultural institutions at YBC 
were able to tap into an established local art scene. Prior to the cultural institutions opening at 
YBC, the city already contained a large and vibrant collection of galleries and smaller arts 
organizations. In contrast, San Jose has never had more than a handful of establishments and 
these struggle to nurture a local art scene. Fourth, the presence of private philanthropists to 
support the cultural flagships may contribute to a successful project. San Jose’s farming past, 
rapid post-World War II growth, and hi-tech present all contribute to a lack of multi-generational 
wealth and, consequently, small base of artistic benefactors. San Francisco, in contrast, enjoys a 
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large number of collectors and philanthropists who sit on the boards of and donate to its major 
arts institutions. For example, in fiscal year 2005, SJMA had just 26 individuals donate $10,000 
or more, while SFMOMA had 168 such donors (SJMA, 2005; SFMOMA, 2004).   
Conversely, without a concentrated base and recognized arts identity, regional arts 
activity may actually sap demand from downtown cultural projects. Although downtown has 
traditionally been considered the center of the arts in most US cities, flagship cultural projects 
around the country increasingly compete with the growing number of suburban arts centers. This 
is particularly a problem for a city like San Jose that does not have previously established arts 
clusters immediately surrounding the downtown cultural institutions. As a result, downtown vies 
for an audience with arts centers in Palo Alto, Mountain View, and other nearby cities as well as 
the cultural destinations of the entire Bay Area just 45 miles to the north (Davis, 2005, interview; 
Giles, 2005, interview). Not only this, but downtown San Jose is surrounded by globally 
recognized tourist destinations and a number of large shopping centers and small downtown 
areas, which may draw potential tenants and visitors. In contrast, YBCA was the first of its kind 
in the Bay Area and SFMOMA was already established as one of the top museums in the region 
if not the nation when it moved to YBC. 
Facility Planning Process 
Decisions made in the planning process can have a lasting impact on the catalytic 
potential of a cultural project. This is most apparent in two ways: 1) approaches to cultural 
facility development and financial support and 2) the role and level of community participation 
in the planning process. In both instances, the contrast between the CRA and SFRA is most 
instructive. First, each of the redevelopment agencies took a different approach to financing and 
development. In Los Angeles, the CRA focused on up-front costs while the SFRA chose a more 
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long-term strategy. Inexperienced in arts planning and focused on property development, the 
CRA assumed that the museum could rely on philanthropy to maintain its endowment and solely 
provided funds for the MOCA building by dedicating the entire redevelopment project public art 
fund to facility construction rather than distributing it for separate works of art throughout the 
redevelopment area. While this innovative use of public art funds very likely contributed more to 
the overall project goals than a series of public art pieces, it did nothing to address MOCA’s 
longer-term funding needs such as building maintenance and programming. This approach hurt 
MOCA’s catalytic potential because it did not relieve any of the pressure commonly associated 
with fledgling museums. All MOCA staff interviewed lamented that with its large new home, the 
museum was forced to direct precious resources and energy towards building maintenance, 
raising an endowment, and fund raising activities. In the process, support for cutting-edge work 
and that of regional artists as well as outreach activities diminished and contributed to the 
perception of MOCA as a contemporary art museum that neglected the local arts scene. The 
CRA also demonstrated a hands-off approach during the planning stages through decisions 
related to design. MOCA suffers from design issues in part due to the restrictions placed on the 
museum by the California Plaza developers and the failure of the CRA to intervene on their 
behalf making the objective of attracting arts and tourist activity to an office district even more 
difficult. 
 At YBC, the SFRA implemented a much more comprehensive cultural strategy that 
provided financial support for the establishment of both flagship and smaller cultural institutions. 
Further, the Agency created a fund to minimize building and maintenance costs through fees 
assessed on major commercial tenants for some of these institutions. This approach increased the 
likelihood that the redevelopment area would be associated with cultural uses, which the Agency 
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positioned as a primary attraction for commercial activity. By requiring major commercial 
tenants to support the cultural institutions, the SFRA in a sense required them to finance the 
amenities that they benefited from in terms of enhancing the image and appeal of their own 
project. The fund in turn meant that the cultural institutions could dedicate more time and energy 
to programming and outreach-- both central to the YBCA mandate. In fact, the ability of the 
cultural facilities to catalyze development might be viewed as dependant on Agency subsidies 
because this enabled a number of nonprofit cultural institutions to open in the redevelopment 
area, which in turn generated interest from other art spaces and related establishments.  
 However, cultural planning at YBC focused solely on growth and did not consider 
preventive measures to mitigate potential negative effects associated with property development. 
This became dramatically clear during the dot-com-induced real estate frenzy of the late 1990’s. 
Nonprofit arts organizations, artists, and commercial galleries, which were concentrated in areas 
such as South of Market were faced with massive rent increases due to the influx of new real 
estate development and tech firms and, as a result, were forced out of the area or to close 
permanently (Solnit and Scwartzenberg, 2000). Of the 17 galleries and cultural facilities that 
moved to the YBC area between 1993 (the year YBCA opened) and 1998, only five remain in 
their 1990’s location (Baker, 1995).  
Community participation was also a key ingredient in the planning process and, 
ultimately, in shaping the catalytic potential and public support of the cultural projects. 
Community input, although not initially intended as a component of YBC project planning, was 
a major factor in the decision to develop a wide range of cultural institutions there. Most notably, 
the SFRA conducted public meetings to determine the agenda for YBCA and attracted over 200 
individuals involved in the arts in San Francisco to each meeting (Pritikin, 2005, interview). 
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These initial meetings led to the formation of a smaller facility planning committee comprised of 
prominent members of the local arts community that made recommendations on the type of 
facilities, programming, target audience, and financing strategy, all of which were beyond the 
experience of the Redevelopment Agency (Sause, 2005, interview). Due to this participation, 
public support, and a high-profile site, YBCA represents a unique flagship institution in that it is 
internationally recognized as an artist forum and a home for local and experimental art in the city 
center. As such, rather than focusing solely on attracting tourists and conventioneers like so 
many other downtown redevelopment projects, YBCA helps to bring a more diverse group of 
people and establishments to the redevelopment area. Furthermore, improvements to the overall 
project design including the preservation of the area’s alleys, the underground convention center, 
and Yerba Buena Gardens were a direct result of community protest and the subsequent 
community planning process. 
 In Los Angeles, public input in project planning was minimal. Although the MOCA 
board called upon well-known local artists as advisors in facility design and planning, they had 
no voice in the selection of the development team and both the board and CRA ignored their 
recommendations for museum design (Berelowitz, 1991; Dreyfus, 1981). In particular, Isozaki’s 
postmodern museum design was contrary to the artists’ vision of a museum modeled after a 
converted artist studio warehouse. Rather than symbolizing a museum dedicated to contemporary 
art making, the building represents high culture. Decisions such as this created friction that early 
on pushed away local artists. Moreover, as discussed above, the CRA’s failure to consult artists 
and smaller arts establishments to identify their needs hindered MOCA’s catalytic potential.  
Rethinking Flagship Cultural Development  
In contrast to a few widely reported success stories like that of the Guggenheim Bilbao, 
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these case studies show that flagship development involves much more than erecting an iconic, 
large-scale cultural facility. While this redevelopment strategy is based on the assumption that 
the cultural institution will play a determining role in area development, the cases underscore 
that the catalytic process is not a simple cause and effect, automatically setting in motion a cycle 
of urban revitalization. Further, the analysis reveals important qualifications to the catalyst 
theories of Jacobs (1961), Sternberg (2002) and Attoe and Logan (1989). Although certain 
attributes of the physical environment play an important role, cultural flagships do not simply 
generate “secondary diversity” under the appropriate physical conditions. Rather, multiple 
factors not directly related to urban design play a crucial role in development outcomes. This 
includes the level of potential demand by arts and commercial establishments, the availability of 
suitable and affordable spaces for them, the composition of the regional arts community, and the 
approach of the sponsoring agencies towards cultural facility financing and community 
engagement. Indeed, a weakness of flagship cultural development is the tendency toward site 
specific planning that overlooks not only the complexity of the immediate context, but the region 
at large. Not only this, but none of the projects have retained their iconic status when held up to 
more recently constructed flagship cultural projects. 
In fact, given the wide range of contextual factors, the very concept of catalyst may be 
inappropriate. Rather than considering cultural flagships primarily as distinct spectacles to lure 
visitors and new development, it may be more appropriate to look beyond the project boundaries 
and think of them in relation to existing arts and cultural resources. Although the SFRA 
incorporated community input and some consideration of the local context into project planning, 
none of the cases approached the flagship cultural projects as part of a coordinated and inclusive 
city or region-wide arts or cultural planning process. While the fact that the Agencies were 
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charged with redeveloping a specific area may have contributed to this situation, it does not 
prevent future flagship planning from adopting a more comprehensive view, which may resolve 
many of the issues that emerged particularly in the Los Angeles and San Jose cases.  
A key step involves mapping and assessing the cultural assets and needs of an area to 
identify ways to build on and link existing strengths and address potential problems (Borrup, 
2006; Evans and Foord, 2008). Approaching flagship cultural projects within this wider process 
increases the likelihood that they are developed in relation to existing or emerging arts clusters 
and, in turn, prompts consideration of ways to enhance the potential synergies between a cultural 
anchor and artistic communities. Reflecting on the cases, this may include ensuring that 
appropriate space is available nearby for artists, nonprofit arts organizations, and small cultural 
industry firms or encouraging its creation through rezoning or financial incentives. Additionally, 
approaching cultural flagship development within a wider lens increases the likelihood that 
funding will be directed not only toward facility development, but also to programs that support 
partnerships between flagship cultural projects, artists, and other arts organizations. Further, 
programs like the SFRA arts linkage policy could be adapted to nurture local talent by 
subsidizing artist-run spaces in and around the project area or transferred to a regional fund to 
support emerging artists. Rethinking flagship cultural development within a wider planning 
process, rather than as a catalytic process, can improve the development role of flagship cultural 
projects while more directly benefiting and growing local arts communities. 
Notes 
                                                 
1 In this article, I use the terms flagship cultural project and cultural flagship interchangeably to denote one or more 
adjacent museum s and/or performing arts institutions that are generally over 100,000 square feet each, among a 
city’s major cultural attractions, and are intended to attract development to the immediate area and positively affect 
the city image.  
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2 Flagship cultural projects have earlier origins in Lincoln Center in New York and Centre Pompidou in Paris built 
in the 1960’s and 1970’s respectively as catalysts for area redevelopment. 
3 One limitation of this study, however, is that the interviews did not extend to all individuals potentially affected by 
the projects and so does not fully capture the point of view of all possible users.  
4 For a more detailed discussion of urban design and cultural institutions see Grodach (2008b). 
5 Disney Hall has, however, influenced the decision to initiate the Grand Avenue Project, a $2.05 billion CRA-
County mega-complex aimed at further reimaging Bunker Hill. This project is behind schedule and has yet to break 
ground. 
6 The site was initially slated by the CRA for an office tower but abandoned during the 1980’s recession and 
subsequent downturn in demand for office space.  This year, an $80 million expansion of the school opened. 
7 The San Francisco CSMA has a population that is 59% White and 38% college educated while SFMOMA’s 
audience is 80% White and 76% college educated.  Although 68% of YBCA’s visitors are White and 69% hold a 
college degree, 17% earn less than $15,000 per year compared to 10% in the region and at SFMOMA (US Census, 
2004; San Francisco Museum of Modern Art, 2004; Yerba Buena Center for the Arts, 2003). 
8 This issue was repeatedly mentioned in the survey. With the exception of Crown Point Press at 12,000 square feet, 
the private galleries range in size from 1,500 to 6,500 square feet. 
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